

Fragmented Party Offer, Vote Choice and Attitude Change: a Study on Right-wing Voters in the 2022 French Presidential Elections

Pre-Analysis Plan

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1 Motivation

Over the last two decades, party system fragmentation has dramatically increased in Western democracies (Chiaromonte & Emanuele, 2019; Emanuele & Chiaromonte, 2018, 2019). This change has not come alone. On the contrary, polarization and dissatisfaction with the democratic process are arguably on the rise too (Boxell et al., 2020; Martini & Quaranta, 2020). This project links both phenomena by analyzing the attitudinal correlates of new party voting and the effect of electoral results on attitude change when a new party enters. To do so, it leverages the unique context of the 2022 French presidential election, where a new far-right challenger (the novel candidate Éric Zemmour) is likely to obtain sizeable electoral support.

The study consists of a two-wave panel survey among potential right-wing voters before and after the 1st round of the election. Its goal is two-fold. First, the pre-electoral wave aims to disentangle the correlates of new party voting when more than one viable options is available within the same ideological space. Second, the post-electoral wave allows us to analyse pre-post election attitude change. An additional survey experiment assesses the effect of electoral information frames on satisfaction with democracy (SWD), political trust and efficacy among new party supporters.

2 Study design

2.1 Overview of the study

The study is divided in two parts. The first part is observational. It consists of a series of survey items collected through two consecutive questionnaires over the same set of respondents. The panel structure of the survey is centered around the first round of the 2022 French presidential elections, which will take place on the 10th of April of 2022. The first questionnaire will be fielded two weeks before the elections while the second questionnaire will be fielded the two weeks after.

The second part of the study consists of a survey experiment included in the second wave of the panel. It aims to manipulate the frame with which the respondents are presented with objective information about the electoral results of the new party to assess its effect on changes in SWD, political trust and efficacy among new party supporters.

2.2 Description and implementation

2.2.1 Design of the Facebook Ads Campaign



The main methodological innovation of the project is to target solely potential radical right voters. By focusing on this group, we should be able to differentiate between supporters of the two right-wing candidates with sufficient statistical power to identify significant differences both across and within them. To approximate a representative sample of the target population (i.e., eligible French voters with radical right party preferences), participants will be recruited using Facebook ads. The Facebook Advertisement Manager system (FAM)¹ allows researchers to immediately recruit participants from the large pool of active Facebook users (more than 2.8 billion users worldwide). It has been proven to successfully recruit samples from specific and hard-to-reach populations (e.g., Pötzschke & Weiß, 2021). In addition, FAM has been shown to be more cost-efficient than traditional survey recruitment methods and to minimise ethical concerns by leveraging publicly available self-selected information (Neundorf & Öztürk, 2021b, 2021a). In our FAM campaign, we will specify observable interests linked to unobservable right-wing ideological characteristics.

To decide on the targeting parameters of our FAM campaign, we have first launched a pre-test campaign linked to a pilot survey in Qualtrics. The pre-test campaign was divided in two ad-sets. The first ad-set targeted only FB users between 18 and 39 years old, while the second ad-set targeted only FB users between 40 and more than 65 years old. In both cases, we included interest in media channels strongly biased towards right and radical right ideology as our main targeting parameters. The sample of the pilot survey confirmed that our strategy was successful. The mean ideology of our sample is 7.4 and the median 8.5 (SD = 3.43). The preference for radical right-wing candidates is clearly over represented, with a 30.45% of the respondents declaring vote intention for Zemmour and 16.25% declaring vote intention for Le Pen, while vote intention for Macron is only 7.25%.

One threat to our sampling strategy was that the age of the respondents in our pre-test sample was clearly biased towards older voters. The mean birth year of the pilot sample is 1965 and the median 1960 (SD = 16.1). The sample is also biased towards men, that constitute the 71% of the respondents. To improve the representativeness of the final sample, we have included changes in the FAM campaign.


The initial campaign consisted of two identical ads with the same image and message. The ad can be seen in Figure 1. In the final campaign, we will include a modified versions of the ad for different age and gender groups. In total, we will have four different ads for six AGE


¹Meta Inc.

 **FORG - Groupe de Recherche sur l'Opinion Publique Française** ...
Published by [Álvaro Canalejo Molero](#) · 23 March at 17:23 · 

Êtes-vous inquiet pour la nation française? Participez à ce questionnaire et gagnez peut-être un bon d'achat de 20€

Are you worried for French nation? take part in this quiz and you might win a €20 voucher

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Donnez votre avis!
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Figure 1: Pre-test Campaign Ad 1

Table 1: FAM targeting campaign

| Ad-set | Gender | Age | Ad name | Image | Message |
|----------|--------|--------|--------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|
| ad-set_1 | Male | 18-35 | new ad 1 | young males | new + emojis |
| ad-set_2 | Male | 36-55 | new ad 1 original ad 1 | young males original | new original |
| ad-set_3 | Male | 56-65+ | original ad 1 | original | original |
| ad-set_4 | Female | 18-35 | new ad 2 | young female | new + emojis |
| ad-set_5 | Female | 36-55 | new ad 2 new ad 2 | young female granddaughter | new original |
| ad-set_6 | Female | 56-65+ | new ad 3 | granddaughter | original |

X GENDER groups. The final targeting strategy is displayed in Table 1.

2.2.2 Timing, attrition and ethical concerns

We will initiate the campaign ten days before the first round of the French presidential elections (10th April 2022). Participants who complete the first questionnaire will be asked to participate in the second wave. An email with instructions to participate in the second questionnaire will be send immediately after the first round of the elections. This questionnaire should be completed before the second round begins (24th April 2022).

To incentivize participation and minimize attrition, we will follow three steps. First, our ads will systematically include a message asking French citizens to participate survey because their opinions are important for the French nation. Therefore, the ads will emphasize an implicit ethno-nationalistic view of France to call the attention of our population of interest. To reinforce this message, we will systematically include a French flag as an embedded image. Second, we won't mention any concept related to Europe or politics in the ads, although we will inform respondents about the content of the survey once in Qualtrics before they give their consent. Third, we will also announce a lottery for a 200€ Amazon voucher for those that complete both rounds of the survey.

We will inform about the lottery in four different moments. First, we will mention it in the ads, without specifying the conditions. Second, we will specify the conditions once in Qualtrics before starting the survey. In that moment, we will ask the potential respondent for an email to which link the second questionnaire. We will emphasize that only those that complete both questionnaires will participate in the lottery, inform them about the date of the lottery, and that we won't ever contact them again afterwards, and only if they win it. If they do not give us a valid email, we will allow them to complete the questionnaire, but we will remind them of the importance of giving their email at the end of the survey. Third, we will insist on the importance of checking their email after the 10th of April for

completing the second part of the questionnaire and participating in the lottery at the end of the survey. Finally, we will repeat that their participation on the second questionnaire is a necessary condition to participate in the lottery on the email including the link to the second questionnaire. If they don't complete the questionnaire, we will send them up to two reminders in the following days.

3 Research plan

3.1 Observational study

3.1.1 Exploring vote choice

The first goal of the observational part of the study is exploratory. We will tap information on a set of variables typically discussed on the literature on abstention, new party voting and populist/radical-right party voting. In the current French scenario, the right side of the ideological spectrum provides three candidates that are equally likely to pass to the 2nd round. We will exploit this lack of variation on strategic incentives to support any specific party, as well as the similarity of their policy platforms, to disentangle the socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics that make voters more likely to support the newcomer, one of the established parties or to abstain.

Specifically, we will collect information on socio-economic characteristics; evaluation of the economy; political engagement; attitudes and trust towards democracy and parties; issue and ideological positions; issue saliency; partisan identity and affective polarization; self-declared vote intention and past political behavior; and opinion about specific features of the current political context in France.

Using self-declared vote intention in the the pre-electoral wave and self-declared vote choice on the post-electoral wave, we will test the relative importance of each of these covariates on the likelihood of abstaining or supporting each of the two radical right-wing candidate (i.e., Éric Zemmour or Marine Le Pen), or other. In addition, we will analyse what makes voters more likely to support the right-wing winner of the first round (if any) in the second round when it wasn't their preferred candidate in the first round.

3.1.2 Exploring attitude change after the election

The second goal of the study is also exploratory. We will exploit the dynamic nature of our survey to analyse attitude change after the election. Since it is unclear which right-wing candidate (if any) will advance to the second round of the election, we argue that becoming

the right-side winner can be considered as if random (see Figure 2). Therefore, the specific features of the winner will send a strong signal about the public opinion mood. To identify the effect of the electoral outcome on attitude change, we will calculate the difference between pre- and post-election values for a set of variables across respondents and test differences across clusters of voters by party preference, focusing on differences between winners and losers.




Figure 2: Vote intention in the 1st round of the French presidential elections according to polls / Source: <https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/>

The first one includes partisanship, affective and perceived polarization. We generally posit that the party supporters of the first round winners will experience a boost of affective polarization. Affective polarization is defined as “the extent to which citizens hold both positive ingroup affect and negative out-group affect towards parties” (Wagner, 2021). Winning party supporters are expected to evaluate their ingroup party more positively and the out-group winner party more negatively as a result of their first round electoral success. In addition, we will explore whether changes in affective polarization occurs for partisans of the loser right-wing parties or whether affective polarization is directed towards other parties from the Left. Finally, we will analyse changes in party identification and evaluations from non-party supporters and changes of perceived polarization across the different clusters of party supporters/non-supporters.

The second cluster of variables includes satisfaction with the way democracy works, external efficacy and trust in political institutions. We generally expect that voters of the right-side winner will experience an increase on SWD, external efficacy and political trust. However, we also foresee that radical party voters may not translate their satisfaction with the electoral

Table 2: Hypothesized attitude change after elections

| Candidates | Extremism | Winning effect on affective polarization | Winning effect on SWD |
|------------|-------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Pécresse | medium | positive for party identifiers | positive for supporters |
| Le Pen | medium-high | positive for party identifiers | positive/no change for supporters |
| Zemmour | high | positive for party identifiers | positive/no change for supporters |

results to their evaluations of democratic institutions. Finally, we will explore heterogeneous changes across cluster of voters. A summary of our expectations is displayed in Table 2.

3.2 Survey experiment

The third goal of the study is explanatory. It consists of a survey experiment that aims to test if different frames for presenting the electoral results affect changes in SWD after the election, particularly among new party voters.

3.2.1 Motivation

The experiment is part of an ongoing research project of the research team member Álvaro Canalejo-Molero on the effect of new party (parliamentary) entry on SWD, political trust and efficacy. Preliminary findings suggest that voters of new parties that enter parliament just above the electoral threshold become more satisfied with the democratic process than voters of parties that fall just below, but only when the new party does not hold radical ideological views. Using pre- and post-electoral survey data for voters of new parties that enter parliament quite above the threshold, similar results hold. Voters of new radical parties do not become more supportive of democratic institutions even when obtaining a sizeable part of the seats. In addition, this (lack of) effect does not seem driven by unmet electoral expectations, dissatisfaction with the electoral results or echo-chambered messages of radical parties in parliament. Thus, *what does drive new radical party voters lack of engagement after their party entry in democratic institutions?*

3.2.2 Hypotheses

We theorize that radical party voters do not experience a boost on SWD after their party entry because of three non-mutually exclusive explanations. First, they may be satisfied with the electoral results, but do not translate this satisfaction into their evaluation of the democratic process because of their rejection linked with existing elites' victory. In other words, their rejection of the (mainstream) winner may be higher than their satisfaction for

their (new) party success. Two hypotheses can be derived from this expectation. First, new party voters would report higher levels of SWD if primed with the electoral success of their party:

Hypothesis 1 New party voters receiving electoral information together with a statement emphasizing the success of the new party will report higher levels of SWD than those receiving only objective electoral information.

Second, these voters would report lower levels of SWD if primed with the electoral success of the mainstream winner:

Hypothesis 2 New party voters receiving electoral information together with a statement emphasizing the success of the mainstream party will report lower levels of SWD than those receiving only objective electoral information.

Another explanation for the lack of effect of parliamentary entry on SWD among radical party voters is that they may hold an illiberal view of democracy, according to which the parliament would be an insignificant institution with derisory powers. This may be particularly true in a semi-presidential system with a sharp bias towards majoritarian government like France. To disentangle this possibility, we will test two versions of hypothesis 1:

Hypothesis 1a New party voters receiving electoral information together with a statement emphasizing the success of the new party at potentially entering parliament will report higher levels of SWD than those receiving only objective electoral information.

Hypothesis 1b New party voters receiving electoral information together with a statement emphasizing the success of the new party at potentially enter government will report higher levels of SWD than those receiving only objective electoral information.

Alternatively, new party voters may be indifferent to the results of the mainstream winner. Instead, they may not translate their satisfaction with the results into satisfaction with democratic institutions because the mainstream discourse highlights the dangers of the party for these institutions. If the recurrent discourse in mass and social media, or by mainstream parties, is that the (relative) victory of the new challenger poses a danger to the well functioning of democracy, they may turn against the democratic institutions that mainstream actors claim to represent. Therefore, we expect that new party voters will report lower levels of SWD if primed with a negative message about the consequences of their party results:

Hypothesis 3 New party voters receiving electoral information together with a

Table 3: Hypothesized treatment effects

| Experimental group | Description of the treatment | Effect on SWD |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Control | Objective information (OI) | Baseline |
| Treatment 1a | OI + emphasis on the success of the new party (potentially at parl.) | Positive effect |
| Treatment 1b | OI + emphasis on the success of the new party (potentially at govt.) | Positive effect |
| Treatment 2 | OI + emphasis on the success of the winner party | Negative effect |
| Treatment 3 | OI + emphasis on the dangers of the new party | Negative effect |
| Placebo | OI + emphasis on a negative non-salient issue | No effect |

statement emphasizing the dangers of the new party will report lower levels of SWD than those receiving only objective electoral information.

To rule out the possibility that negative messages, independently of their specific content, drive negative changes in SWD, we also hypothesize that priming new party voters with a negative message about a non-salient issue affected by the electoral results, would not generate any significant change in SWD:

Hypothesis 4 (placebo) New party voters receiving electoral information together with a statement emphasizing the difficulties of advancing climate change policies in a fragmented electoral scenario will not report statistically distinguishable levels of SWD from those receiving only objective electoral information.

We will test these hypotheses using two outcomes: post-electoral levels of SWD and change in SWD between the two waves. For the latter, we will reject the null hypothesis whenever change in SWD is significantly different across the control and treated group in the expected direction, independently of its size (e.g., we will reject the null of hypothesis 1 if new party voters experience a smaller change in SWD but the change experienced by the control group has a negative direction). In addition, we will test the same hypotheses for related outcomes to ensure the robustness of the results. In particular, we will use measures of political trust, internal and external efficacy, change in political trust, and change in internal and external efficacy, as well as latent variables constructed with factor scores of SWD, indicators of political trust and indicators of political efficacy altogether.

3.2.3 Experimental design: main features

To test the hypotheses in Table 3, we will include a framing experiment on the second wave of the survey. Framing experiments involves manipulating the selection and salience of information that are presented to participants (Entman, 1993). In this experiment, respondents will be presented with objective information about the results of the 1st round the pres-

idential elections. Then, an accompanying statement will vary the emphasis according to five experimental conditions, each of one directed to test each of the preceding hypotheses. The control group will only receive the electoral information, without any accompanying statement.

The experiment will be blocked by vote choice, so that each experimental condition will be independently randomized within three groups of voters: self-declared voters of Zemmour, self-declared voters of Le Pen, and a placebo group including the rest of respondents. This is useful because by homogenizing the participants, the estimates will be more precise. Furthermore, this ensures that each of these groups is proportionally represented for each experimental condition (Mutz, 2011, pp. 95–97).

An additional reason to block the experiment on vote choice is that only the group of self-declared Zemmour voters meet the scope conditions of our argument (i.e., voters of a new radical party with sizeable electoral support). For this reason, we will test our hypotheses only with this group. We will also run the experiment on the rest of respondents as a placebo test, just to check that other clusters of voters are not affected by information highlighting the electoral results of Zemmour, or at least not in the expected direction. As for voters of Le Pen, we will slightly modify three of the treatment conditions (treatment 1a, 1b and 3) to make them fit with Le Pen instead of Zemmour as an additional placebo test, just to check the extent to which voters of old parties are affected in the same way as voters of new parties.

We contemplate three scenarios. The first scenario is that Éric Zemmour does not pass to the second round but Marine Le Pen does. The second scenario is that Éric Zemmour passes to the second round instead of Marine Le Pen. The third scenario is that none of them does. Depending on the scenario, the experiment will consist on the following vignettes:

3.2.3.1 Scenario 1: Marine Le Pen passes to the second round

3.2.3.1.1 Vignettes for Éric Zemmour voters and the placebo group

1. Control condition: Objective information (OI)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Please, indicate if you have carefully read the statement above. *Yes/no*

2. Treatment 1a: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at parliament)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Éric Zemmour* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he may win many seats at the national assembly*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3. Treatment 1b: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at government)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Éric Zemmour* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *the winner of the second round may consider including him in the new government*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

4. Treatment 2: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the winner party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Emmanuel Macron* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he has a great chance of becoming the winner of the second round*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

5. Treatment 3: OI + emphasis on the dangers of the new party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Éric Zemmour* obtained particularly *worrying* results, specially because *of his controversial opinions during the campaign*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

6. Treatment 4: OI + emphasis on the effect of Covid-19 on the economy

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the candidates competing, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the *division of the vote might pose a problem for finding agreements on climate change policy*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3.2.3.1.2 Vignettes for Marine Le Pen

1. Control condition: Objective information (OI)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Please, indicate if you have carefully read the statement above. *Yes/no*

2. Treatment 1a: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at parliament)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Marine Le Pen* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *she will probably win many seats at the national assembly*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3. Treatment 1b: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at government)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Marine Le Pen* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *she has a great chance of becoming the winner of the second round*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

4. Treatment 2: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the winner party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Emmanuel Macron* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he has a great chance of becoming the winner of the second round.*

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

5. Treatment 3: OI + emphasis on the dangers of the new party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Marine Le Pen* obtained particularly *worrying* results, specially because *of her controversial opinions during the campaign.*

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

6. Treatment 4: OI + emphasis on the effect of Covid-19 on the economy

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the candidates competing, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the *division of the vote might pose a problem for finding agreements on climate change policy.*

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3.2.3.2 Scenario 2: *Éric Zemmour* passes to the second round

3.2.3.2.1 Vignettes for *Éric Zemmour* voters and the placebo group

1. Control condition: Objective information (OI)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Please, indicate if you have carefully read the statement above. *Yes/no*

2. Treatment 1a: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at parliament)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Éric Zemmour* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he will probably win many seats at the national assembly.*

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3. Treatment 1b: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at government)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Éric Zemmour* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he has a great chance of becoming the winner of the second round*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

4. Treatment 2: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the winner party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Emmanuel Macron* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he has a great chance of becoming the winner of the second round*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

5. Treatment 3: OI + emphasis on the dangers of the new party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Éric Zemmour* obtained particularly *worrying* results, specially because *of his controversial opinions during the campaign*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

6. Treatment 4: OI + emphasis on the effect of Covid-19 on the economy

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the candidates competing, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the *division of the vote might pose a problem for finding agreements on climate change policy.*

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3.2.3.2.2 Vignettes for Marine Le Pen

1. Control condition: Objective information (OI)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Please, indicate if you have carefully read the statement above. *Yes/no*

2. Treatment 1a: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at parliament)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Marine Le Pen* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *she may win many seats at the national assembly.*

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3. Treatment 1b: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at government)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Marine Le Pen* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *the winner of the second round may consider including her in the new government*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

4. Treatment 2: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the winner party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Emmanuel Macron* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he has a great chance of becoming the winner of the second round*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

5. Treatment 3: OI + emphasis on the dangers of the new party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Marine Le Pen* obtained particularly *worrying* results, specially because of her *controversial opinions during the campaign*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

6. Treatment 4: OI + emphasis on the effect of Covid-19 on the economy

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the candidates competing, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the *division of the vote might pose a problem for finding agreements on climate change policy*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3.2.3.3 Scenario 3: neither Marine Le Pen nor Éric Zemmour pass to the second round

3.2.3.3.1 Vignettes for Éric Zemmour voters and the placebo group

1. Control condition: Objective information (OI)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Please, indicate if you have carefully read the statement above. *Yes/no*

2. Treatment 1a: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at parliament)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Éric Zemmour* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he may win many seats at the national assembly*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3. Treatment 1b: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at government)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Éric Zemmour* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *the winner of the second round may consider including him in the new government*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

4. Treatment 2: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the winner party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Emmanuel Macron* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he has a great chance of becoming the winner of the second round*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

5. Treatment 3: OI + emphasis on the dangers of the new party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Éric Zemmour* obtained particularly *worrying* results, specially because of *his controversial opinions during the campaign*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

6. Treatment 4: OI + emphasis on the effect of Covid-19 on the economy

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the candidates competing, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the *division of the vote might pose a problem for finding agreements on climate change policy*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3.2.3.3.2 Vignettes for Marine Le Pen

1. Control condition: Objective information (OI)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Please, indicate if you have carefully read the statement above. *Yes/no*

2. Treatment 1a: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at parliament)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Marine Le Pen* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *she may win many seats at the national assembly*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3. Treatment 1b: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the new party (at government)

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Marine Le Pen* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *the winner of the second round may consider including her in the new government*.

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

4. Treatment 2: OI + emphasis on the relative success of the winner party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Emmanuel Macron* obtained particularly *good* results, specially because *he has a great chance of becoming the winner of the second round.*

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

5. Treatment 3: OI + emphasis on the dangers of the new party

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the competing candidates, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the candidate *Marine Le Pen* obtained particularly *worrying* results, specially because *of her controversial opinions during the campaign.*

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

6. Treatment 4: OI + emphasis on the effect of Covid-19 on the economy

The results of the first round of the presidential elections were known already the 10th of April. Among the candidates competing, Emmanuel Macron and (*second winner*) passed to the second round. The candidate (*first loser*) and the candidate (*second loser*) obtained a ___ % and a ___ % of the vote share respectively.

Some people highlight that the *division of the vote might pose a problem for finding agreements on climate change policy.*

Do you agree with the statement above? *Yes/no/dk*

3.2.4 Experimental design: additional features

For all conditions except for the control one, the treatment is followed by a *yes or no (or I don't know)* question to increase the likelihood that respondents carefully read the treatment. The answer of the question is not of analytical interest, but it also serves to make respondents more likely to believe that the solely reason for the inclusion of the reported information (i.e., the treatment) is to collect information on this. By checking consistency among the answer to this question and the elicited treatment, we will also use it as a manipulation check.

To increase our confidence on the effectiveness of the experiment, we will also include an attention check three survey scroll-pages before the treatment. We will also ask an open-ended question about the respondent feelings about the electoral results at the end of the survey. Additionally, we will not include the questions capturing the outcome variables just after the treatment but include a transition question in between, so that respondents feel the flow of the survey more natural and have more difficulties on identifying the goal of the experiment. The question is included in the vignettes above. Finally, we will randomize the question capturing the main outcome variable (SWD) with questions capturing alternative outcome variables and placebo outcomes (ei., trust in non-political institutions and political efficacy).

3.2.5 Ethics Committee Review

This experiment was submitted for approval to the Ethics Committee of the European University Institute on the 28th of February. Hypothesis and treatment 1b were not included on the application. Following the results of the pilot study, some of the other vignettes experienced minor modifications from the original text.

4 Data measurement

The empirical variables will be constructed using survey items. The specific wording of the survey questions is specified in the Appendix. We can distinguish between two sets of variables that will be used for the experiment: main variables and additional covariates. The

main variables consist of the treatment, outcomes and placebo outcomes. The additional covariates will be used to ensure balance across groups of respondents and as control variables in the regression models estimating the average treatment effect to increase the precision of the estimates.

4.1 Main variables

4.1.1 Treatment

- Treatment: a unordered categorical variable with six categories. The baseline category is the control condition with each of the other categories representing each of the treatments

4.1.2 Outcomes

- Satisfaction with democracy: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (Extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (Extremely satisfied)
- Trust in parliament: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (not trust at all) to 10 (complete trust)
- Trust in political parties: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (not trust at all) to 10 (complete trust)
- External efficacy I: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (fully disagree with the statement) to 10 (fully agree with the statement)
- External efficacy II: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (fully disagree with the statement) to 10 (fully agree with the statement)
- External efficacy index: an index calculated using the formula $External\ efficacy\ I + External\ efficacy\ II / 2$
- Internal efficacy I: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (fully disagree with the statement) to 10 (fully agree with the statement)
- Internal efficacy II: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (fully disagree with the statement) to 10 (fully agree with the statement)
- Internal efficacy index: an index calculated using the formula $Internal\ efficacy\ I + Internal\ efficacy\ II / 2$

- Political trust index: an index calculated using the formula $\text{Trust in parliament} + \text{Trust in political parties} / 2$
- Political satisfaction I: a latent variable calculated using the factor scores of the first factor loading of a factor analysis of the outcome variables Satisfaction with democracy, Trust in parliament, Trust in political parties, External efficacy I, External efficacy II, Internal Efficacy I and Internal efficacy III
- Political satisfaction II: a latent variable calculated using the factor scores of the second factor loading of a factor analysis of the outcome variables Satisfaction with democracy, Trust in parliament, Trust in political parties, External efficacy I, External efficacy II, Internal Efficacy I and Internal efficacy III

4.1.3 Placebo outcomes

- Satisfaction with the economy: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (Extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (Extremely satisfied)
- Trust in the military: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (not trust at all) to 10 (complete trust)
- Trust in media: a continuous variable ranking from 0 (not trust at all) to 10 (complete trust)

4.2 Additional covariates

- Gender: a dichotomous categorical variable with three categories (*male*, *female* and *other*)
- Age: a continuous variable created by extracting the date of birth of the respondents from the date of the interview, and that ranges from 18 to 99
- Municipality size: an ordinal variable with eight categories (*Less than 2000 inhabitants*, *Between 2001 and 5000 inhabitants*, *Between 5001 inhabitants and 10000 inhabitants*, *Between 10001 inhabitants and 50000 inhabitants*, *Between 50001 inhabitants and 100000 inhabitants*, *Between 100001 inhabitants and 500000 inhabitants*, *Between 500001 inhabitants and 1000000 inhabitants* and *More than 1000000 inhabitants*)
- Paris area: a dichotomous categorical variable with two categories (*live in Paris metropolitan area* and *do not live in Paris Metropolitan area*)

- Education: an ordinal variable with five categories (*Primary school or none, Middle School Diploma (Brevet des Collèges), High School Diploma (Baccalauréat general ou Baccalauréat professionnel), University first cycle (Licence) and University second cycle (Master ou equivalent Master)*)
- Occupation: a categorical variable with nine categories (*Agricultural worker, Craftsman, shopkeeper, business owner, Senior managers and intellectual professions, Intermediary professions, Employee, Blue-collar worker, Retired, Other and Unemployed*)
- Income scale: an ordinal variable with five categories (*Less than 1650€, 1651-2220, 2221-3300, 3301-3700 and More than 3700€*)

5 Estimation Procedure

5.1 Observational study

We will estimate two main models for the observational part of the study. To explore the correlates of vote choice, we will regress self-declared vote intention on an array of socio-demographic and attitudinal covariates using the following OLS specification:

$$VoteChoice_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i' + \varepsilon_i$$

To explore attitude change after the election, we will first measure attitude change as the difference between the values of a given attitudinal variable Att in the first (Att_1) and second wave (Att_2) of the questionnaire. Second, we will regress attitude change on Att_1 , self-declared vote choice on the second questionnaire and a vector of control variables X' measured before the election. We will estimate this model for different attitudes and using different party choice categories depending on the electoral results (i.e., winner vs loser, new vs. old, etc.) with the following specification:

$$(Att_{it_2} - Att_{it_1}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Att_{it_1} + \beta_2 VoteChoice_{it_2} + \beta_3 X'_{it_1} + \varepsilon_i$$

5.2 Survey experiment

Our quantity of interest is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) for each treatment category. We will estimate this quantity with at least four different statistical procedures to validate the robustness of the findings. First, we will perform a comparison of means on the outcome

variable between treatment and control groups using an unpaired t-test. Second, we will regress the outcome variable on the treatment variable with an OLS regression with the following specification (model 1):

$$OutVar_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treatment_i + \beta_2 X'_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where X' is a vector of control variables measured before the treatment, that at least includes *gender, age, municipality size, Paris area, education* and *income scale*. The inclusion of these variables should increase the precision of the estimate of the ATE without introducing any bias. We may run alternative specifications modifying the list of control variables included if attrition in any of the control variables is higher than the 10% of the sample.

Third, we will take advantage of the panel structure of the survey to regress changes on the outcome variable between the first and second wave on pre-treatment levels of the outcome variable and the treatment, controlling only for pre-treatment covariates. This model is equivalent to a first-differenced model when the pre-treatment levels of the independent variables are either equal to all the respondents or constant over time. We will estimate the following OLS specification (model 2):

$$\Delta OutVar_{it_2} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treatment_{it_2} + \beta_2 OutVar_{it_1} + \beta_3 X'_{it_1} + \varepsilon_i$$

Finally, we will perform a two-way fixed effects OLS model (model 3) using the following specification:

$$OutVar_{it} = \gamma_0 + \rho_i + \gamma_1 Treatment_{it} + \gamma_2 T_t + \omega_{it}$$

We will replicate each of these models for each of the outcome variables as well as for the placebo outcomes.

6 Inference Criteria

We will use three types of standard errors. For within-block analyses of each experimental block, we will use non-clustered HC2 standard errors for model 1 and 2 and HC2 standard errors clustered at the individual level in model 3. For the joint analyses of experimental blocks, we will use HC2 standard errors clustered at the block level.

For the directional hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, we will use one-tailed tests where $H_1 > H_0$, $H_2 < H_0$ and $H_3 < H_0$. For the placebo hypothesis 4 we will use two-tailed test where $H_4 \neq H_0$. We set $\alpha = 0.05$ and will reject the null when the p-value is less than 0.05. Because we have more than one confirmatory hypothesis, we will adjust for multiple comparisons using familywise error rate (FWER).

7 Procedures for data issues

There are five data problems that this study might face: incongruence responses, sample bias in the first wave, attrition in the second wave, attrition in the outcome variable and ceiling effects on the experiment.

7.1 Incongruence responses

We will check that the respondents answer the questionnaire with congruent and attentive responses using a series of pre-emptive tests:

1. We will include an attention check in both questionnaires. Those respondents that fail the attention check will not be removed from the sample. Instead, we will report descriptive and test statistics with socio-demographic and outcome variables to uncover any pattern that may drive to misleading results. We will also use include a dummy variable capturing inattention in the regression models to increase the precision of the estimates and rule out the possibility of false findings driven by inattentiveness.
2. We will drop from the survey any respondent that finishes the first questionnaire in less than 4 minutes and any respondent that finishes the second questionnaire in less than 3 minutes.
3. We will drop from the survey any respondent that hit the “next” button after reading the experimental vignette in less than 8 seconds.

7.2 Sampling bias in the first wave

We will use pre-electoral survey data collected by an external source to estimate the proportion of radical right-wing party supporters among the French population, and the distribution of its basic socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., gender, age, education and occupation). We will use this data as a benchmark to compare it with the proportion of radical right-wing party supporters and the distribution of its socio-demographic char-

acteristics in our sample. The benchmark will consist of the 7th wave of the panel survey EnEF2022, conducted by researchers from SciencesPo and publicly available at <https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/resultats-et-decryptage-par-vague.html>. This data is representative of the eligible French population on gender, age, occupation and municipality type

We will consider that radical right-wing voters are correctly oversampled if they make at least the double of the proportion of respondents in our sample than in the EnEF2022 sample (e.g., 30% of the respondents in EnEF2022 and 60% in our sample).

We will consider that our sample is balanced if at least 33% of radical right-wing voters in our sample support each of the two main radical right-wing candidates (i.e., at least 33% of Le Pen supporters and 66% of Zemmour supporters or 33% of Zemmour supporters and 66% of Le Pen supporters).

We will consider that our sample is representative of the population of radical right-wing voters if each group of supporters of the main radical right-wing candidates in our sample has similar socio-demographic characteristics than the same groups of voters in EnEF2022. To test this, we will compare the mean and the median (for numeric variables) and the proportion of respondents in each category (for categorical variables) of the chosen socio-demographic variables of each group of voters in our sample with the same statistics of the same variables for the same groups of voters in EnEF2022.

To the extent that any of these three conditions is violated, we will consider that our sample is biased. If this was the case, we will construct weights combining electoral and socio-demographic information about each group of voters using the population characteristics estimated with EnEF2022. We will use these weights in our regression models to increase the validity of our inferences.

7.3 Attrition in the second wave

When respondents drop out from completing the second wave of the survey, we will assess the relationship between attrition and a set of socio-demographic variables (i.e., gender, age, occupation and municipality type) and self-declared vote intention using a hypothesis test and report the results.

If $p < .05$ for any of these variables, we will construct weights combining electoral and socio-demographic information about each group of voters using the population characteristics estimated with EnEF2022. We will use these weights in our regression models to increase

the validity of our inferences.

7.4 Attrition in the outcome variable

When respondents do not answer one or more questions that measure an outcome as we field our survey, we will assess the relationship between missing outcomes and treatment assignment using a hypothesis test and report these results.

If $p < .05$ for the assessment of the relationship between treatment and missing outcomes, we will conduct an extreme value bounds analysis in which we set all of the missing outcomes for treatment to the block maximum and all missing outcomes for control to the block minimum.

If $p \geq .05$ for the assessment of the relationship between treatment and missing outcomes, we will impute the missing outcomes using the mean of the assignment-by-block subcategory.

If we still have outcome questions with particularly high non-response (over 10 percent), we will describe the relationship between non-response to this question and other data on the people via tables and plots of bivariate relationships.

7.5 Ceiling effects

The blocking variable of our experiment (party choice) and the pre-treatment levels of our outcome variables (SWD, political trust and external/internal efficacy) are likely to be endogenously related. This may cause that an important proportion of the respondents participating in the experiment do not report significant changes on the outcome variable after the treatment because they depart from top/bottom pre-treatment outcome levels. To minimize the impact of ceiling effects, we will replicate the analyses excluding up to the 10% of the participants in the experiment with more extreme values on the pre-treatment measure of the outcome variables.

8 Power analysis

To calculate the ideal sample size of our experiment, we proceed with a step-by-step simulation using the R package ‘DeclareDesign’ (Blair et al., 2019). In this simulation, we only consider the openly declared voters of Éric Zemmour as our population of interest and assume that the experiment would produce null results on both Péresse and Le Pen voters. We also assume that any outcome variable would experience a similar reaction to the treatment. Therefore, we perform the simulation only on SWD and extrapolate the conclusions to the rest of the outcome variables.

Our baseline simulation has a sample size of 500 respondents. First, we simulate the population of Zemmour voters and draw a random sample of 500 respondents from it. We assign three variables to each of the respondents in the sample. We assume that *pre-electoral levels of SWD* follows a binomial distribution of size 10 with probability 0.3 to reflect that Zemmour supporters are likely to display lower levels of SWD than the average French population (assuming a probability = 0.5). Since we remain agnostic about the effect of the electoral results on SWD depending on pre-electoral levels of SWD and that Zemmour voters will probably experience an average decrease in SWD as a result of non-winning the election, we assign *post-electoral levels of SWD* with an independent random draw from a binomial distribution of size 10 with probability 0.2 instead of 0.3.

We calculate *change in SWD* as the difference between *post-electoral levels of SWD* and *pre-electoral levels of SWD*. The simulated distribution of *change in SWD* is plotted in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Expected distribution of the pre-treatment outcome variable ‘Change in SWD’

We introduce a fourth variable to reflect a more realistic assumption about our sampling

Table 40: Diagnostics of the experimental design for a sample size of $N = 500$

| Sample_assumptions | QOI | Estimator | Mean_estimand | Mean_estimate | Bias | RMSE | Power | Coverage | N_sims |
|--------------------|---------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------|------|-------|----------|--------|
| Random sample | ate_Y_1 | Diff-in-means | 1 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.73 | 0.96 | 500 |
| Random sample | ate_Y_2 | Diff-in-means | -1 | -1.02 | -0.02 | 0.40 | 0.73 | 0.93 | 500 |
| Random sample | ate_Y_3 | Diff-in-means | -1 | -1.00 | 0.00 | 0.39 | 0.71 | 0.95 | 500 |
| Random sample | ate_Y_4 | Diff-in-means | 0 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.05 | 0.95 | 500 |
| Bottom-cut sample | ate_Y_1 | Diff-in-means | 1 | 1.03 | 0.03 | 0.28 | 0.95 | 0.95 | 500 |
| Bottom-cut sample | ate_Y_2 | Diff-in-means | -1 | -0.98 | 0.02 | 0.28 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 500 |
| Bottom-cut sample | ate_Y_3 | Diff-in-means | -1 | -0.99 | 0.01 | 0.28 | 0.94 | 0.95 | 500 |
| Bottom-cut sample | ate_Y_4 | Diff-in-means | 0 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.30 | 0.05 | 0.95 | 500 |

procedure. Since we rely on the pool of active facebook users and on self-selection into the sample, we assume that potential respondents with bottom levels of SWD may be more reluctant to complete the survey. To reflect this, we create a dummy variable in which potential respondents with pre-electoral levels of SWD < 3 won't ever complete the survey. Thus, we simulate two alternative sample: a completely random sample and a bottom-cut sample in which potential respondents with bottom levels of SWD are categorically excluded from the sample.

To define the ATE for each of the experimental conditions, we assume that the size of the effect of the experiment will be small. The outcome variable *change in SWD* has a scale from -10 to + 10. Therefore, respondents receiving the first treatment will have an expected ATE = +1. Respondents in the second and third treatment conditions will both have an expected ATE = -1 and respondents on the fourth treatment condition (the placebo) will have an expected ATE = 0. For simplicity, we will estimate the ATE with a difference in means, which is a conservative baseline specification since it doesn't considered the added precision of including pre-treatment levels of SWD and control variables in the model. The difference-in-means will be calculated with the specification $ATE = Y_{z_m} - Y_{z_0}$, where Z is the assignment variable for the control group Z_0 and each of the treated groups $Z_{1+\dots+m}$.

We perform 500 simulations for each combination of treatment condition and sampling assumption. The results are displayed in Table 40. The power statistic is close to 0.8 in each of the simulated scenarios, which suggests that the experiment is well-powered for $n = 500$ and an expected ATE of $|1|$ for each treatment condition.

Interestingly, if the sample is biased to favour respondents with higher average pre-treatment levels of SWD, that would benefit our analyses by minimising ceiling effects. This intuition is visualized more clearly in Figure 4.

However, the final sample may be smaller than the baseline sample of $n = 50$. The size of the effect may also be smaller. To visualize how much the power of the experiment would




Figure 4: Density of effect size estimated with 500 simulations for each combination of treatment condition and sampling assumption. Sample size = 500

be affected by sample and effect size, we have imposed stronger assumptions on sample ($n = 50, n = 100, n = 250$ and $n = 500$) and effect size ($ATE = 0.2, ATE = 0.5, ATE = 1$ AND $ATE = 2$) and simulated each combination of sample and effect size one hundred times under the assumption of completely random sampling. We have plotted the expected power under the assumption of completely random sampling. We have plotted the expected power of each of these combinations in the barplot displayed in 5.

The main finding of the simulation is that the experiment needs at least 250 observations to find a significant effect of size $|2|$ more than 80% of the times. Ideally, we would still need 500 observations to find this effect any time. However, 500 observations are also enough to find an effect of $|1|$ almost 80% of the times. As the number of observations decreases by the half, we need an effect of at least $|2|$ to identify it most of the time. With 250 observations, an effect of size $|1|$ would be identified only the half of the times. Importantly, an effect of size $|0.5|$ would be identified only 25% of the times even with a sample size of 500 observations.




Figure 5: Power at each N and expected ATE for Treatment 1. Estimates built with 100 simulations for each combination of ATE and sample size.

These conclusions are drawn from a conservative scenario notwithstanding. The latest simu-

lations are based on the assumption of completely random sampling, which is an unrealistic assumption that reduces the estimated power of our models. In addition, the final models will include pre-electoral levels of SWD, that would remove additional concerns of ceiling effects and increase the precision of the estimates. They will also include a series of pre-treatment control variables that only affect the outcome variable independently of the treatment. Finally, we will calculate latent outcome variables combining alternative single measures of SWD, political trust and external efficacy, which should improve the probability of identifying even small treatment effects. These strategies combined should increase the overall power of the experiment, even if a sample of 500 observations still represent an ideal scenario.

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Appendix I. Survey Questionnaire of the Pre-electoral Wave

Block I. Socio-demographic questions

Thank you for having accepted to participate to this survey. To begin the interview, we will ask you a few questions about yourself.

Q1. Gender : *You are ...*

1. A woman
2. A man
3. Other

Q2. Date of Birth : *What is your birth date?*

dd/mm/yyyy

Q3_1 Municipality size : *What is the size of the town or city where you currently live?*

1. Less than 5000 inhabitants
2. Between 5001 inhabitants and 50 000 inhabitants
3. Between 50 001 inhabitants and 500 000 inhabitants
4. Between 500 001 inhabitants and 1 000 000 inhabitants
5. More than 1 000 000 inhabitants
6. I don't know

Q3_2 Paris area : *Is the town or city where you currently live within the Paris metropolitan area?*

1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know

Q4. Education (INSEE CLASSIFICATION) : *What is your highest-level diploma?*

1. Primary school or none
2. Middle School Diploma (Brevet des Collèges)

3. Professional Certificate, professional Brevet or equivalent
4. High School Diploma (Baccalauréat general ou Baccalauréat professionnel)
5. University first cycle (Licence)
6. University second cycle (Master ou equivalent Master)

Q5. Occupation I (INSEE CLASSIFICATION) : *What is the socioprofessional category of your current job?*

1. Agricultural worker
2. Craftsman, shopkeeper, business owner
3. Senior managers and intellectual professions
4. Intermediary professions
5. Employee
6. Blue-collar worker
7. Retired
8. Other without professional activity

Q5a. Occupation II (INSEE CLASSIFICATION) [Conditional on Q5 = 7] : *If it is applicable in your situation, what was the socio-professional category of your last occupation ? Otherwise, tick "not applicable." What was the socio-professional category of your last occupation (if applicable)?*

1. Agricultural worker
2. Craftsman, shopkeeper, business owner
3. Senior managers and intellectual professions
4. Intermediary professions
5. Employee
6. Blue-collar worker
7. Not applicable

Q6. Income scale (ESS quintiles) : *What is your household's monthly total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate.*

1. Less than 1650€
2. 1651-2220
3. 2221-3300
4. 3301-3700
5. More than 3700€

Block II. Attitudinal questions

Now, we would like to know your opinion about some aspects of the French economy, politics and society.

Q7. Satisfaction with the economy : *On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in France? Please indicate on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you are extremely dissatisfied, 5 means you are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and 10 means that you are extremely satisfied.*

0. Extremely dissatisfied
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. Extremely satisfied
11. Don't know

Q8. Political interest : *How interested would you say you are in politics – are you. . .*

1. very interested

2. quite interested
3. hardly interested
4. not at all interested
5. Don't know

Q9. Satisfaction with democracy : *Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in France? Please indicate on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you are extremely dissatisfied, 5 means you are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and 10 means that you are extremely satisfied.*

0. Extremely dissatisfied
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. Extremely satisfied
11. Don't know

Q10. Trust in institutions : *How much do you trust each of the following institutions from 0 to 10 where 0 means that you do not trust them at all, 5 means you neither trust nor mistrust them and 10 that you completely trust them?*

NB: randomized order

q10_1. *the government*

0. do not trust it at all
- 1.

- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust it
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust it
11. Don't know

q10_2. *the political parties*

0. do not trust them at all
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust them
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust them
11. Don't know

q10_3. *the parliament*

0. do not trust it at all
- 1.

- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust it
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust it
11. Don't know

q10_4. *the president*

0. do not trust him at all
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust him
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust him
11. Don't know

q10_5. *the media*

0. do not trust it at all
- 1.

- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust it
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust it
11. Don't know

q10_6. *the military*

0. do not trust it at all
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust it
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust it
11. Don't know

Q11. Political efficacy and perceptions of polarization : *Let's move to questions about politics in general. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you fully agree and 10 means that you fully disagree.*

NB: randomized order

q11_1. *I am well qualified to play an active role in politics.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q11_2. *Sometimes politics seems so complicated that people like me cannot really understand what is going on.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q11_3. *Politicians promise more than they can deliver.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q11_4. *Politicians are primarily concerned about their personal interests.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q11_5. *Parties are extremely divided nowadays*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q11_6. *Parties and politicians in France are more concerned with fighting each other than with furthering the common interest.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q11_7. *There is at least one party that represents my view reasonably well.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q11_8. *Most of the parties in France are so much alike that it does not make much of a difference which one is in government.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

Q12. Political knowledge: Three factual knowledge questions + Zemmour knowledge

NB: randomized order

q12_1. *Do you know who was the minister of the Economy for the whole 5-year Macron's mandate?*

1. Jean-Michel Blanquer

2. Gérard Darmanin

3. Christophe Castaner

4. Bruno Le Maire

5. I don't know

q12_2. *Do you know who is the current President of the European Commission?*

1. Ursula von der Leyen

2. Jean-Claude Juncker

3. Barnier

4. Charles Michel

5. I don't know

q12_3. *Do you know for how many years lasts the mandate of a deputy?*

1. 3 years

2. 4 years

3. 5 years

4. 6 years

5. I don't know

Q13. Zemmour knowledge: *Do you know the candidate Eric Zemmour? If yes, since when do you know him?*

1. No, I don't know him
2. Yes, since he's a candidate
3. Yes, I know him since more or less a year
4. Yes, I knew him for more than a year ago

Q14. Party identification : *Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?*

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

q14a. Conditional, if 19 = no/don't know : *If you had to chose, do you think of yourself as closer to one of these political parties? If so which one?*

All parties nominated for the first round of elections / "other" open question category available (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

q14b. Conditional, if 19 = yes : *Which one?*

All parties nominated for the first round of elections / "other" open question category available (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

q14c. Conditional, if party identification in 19a or 19b : *How close do you feel to this this party?*

1. Not at all close
2. Not close
3. Quite close
4. Very close
5. Don't know

Q14d Conditional, if party identification in 19a or 19b. Partisan 4-items identity scale : *We would like to find out what people mean when they say they are attached to a particular*

political party or identify more closely with one party rather than with others. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following views.

Q14d_1 *When people criticize this party, it feels like a personal insult.*

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly Agree

Q14d_2 *When I meet someone who supports this party, I feel connected with this person.*

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly Agree

Q14d_3 *When I speak about this party, I refer to them as “my party”.*

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly Agree

Q14d_4 *When people praise this party, it makes me feel good.*

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly Agree

Q.15 Ideology l-r individual : *In politics, people often talk of “left” and “right.” On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right, where would you place yourself?*

0. Left
- 1.

- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. Right

Q16. Ideology l-r parties : *Using the same scale, where would you place each of these parties? If you come to a party you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, you can answer 'don't know.'*

Top 8 parties in the polls (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

0. Left
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. Right
11. Don't know

Q17. MIP : *What do you think are the three most important issues at the moment in France? Please, choose them in descending order according to their importance.*

1. unemployment
2. health
3. immigration
4. rising prices - inflation - cost of living
5. pensions
6. economic situation
7. the education system
8. crime
9. housing
10. terrorism
11. the environment - climate - and energy issues
12. government debt
13. taxation
14. international politics - the war
15. the working of the French democracy - institutions

Q18. Ideology other : *Now, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.*

NB: randomized order

q18_1. *The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.*

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree
6. Don't know.

q18_2. *Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.*

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree
6. Don't know.

q18_3. *Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned*

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree
6. Don't know.

q18_4. *France's cultural life is generally undermined by people coming to live here from other countries*

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree
6. Don't know.

Block III. Electoral questions

Thank you for your answers! For the last set of questions We will now be very interested in getting your opinion on elections...

Q19. Turnout intention : *The first round of the presidential elections will take place on Sunday April 10th 2022. For one reason or another, some people will not vote in these*

elections. How likely it is that you will vote in these elections?

1. I will certainly vote
2. I will probably vote
3. I will maybe vote or not vote
4. I will probably not vote
5. I will certainly not vote

Q19a. Categorical voting intention I (conditional on Q24 == 1) : *And which candidate will you vote for?*

All parties nominated for the first round of elections / “other” open question category available / blank vote option (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

Q19b. Categorical voting intention II (conditional on Q26 == 2|conditional on Q26 == 3|conditional on Q26 == 4) : *If you finally decided to vote for the first round, which candidate would you vote for?*

All parties nominated for the first round of elections / “other” open question category available / null or blank vote option (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

Q20. Affective polarization: *We’d like you to rate how you feel towards the different parties. For each party, please rate it on a scale from -5 to 5, where -5 means you strongly dislike that party and 5 means that you strongly like that party. A rating of 0 means you have no feelings one way or the other. If you come to a party you haven’t heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, you can answer ‘don’t know.’*

for top 8 party candidates (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

-5. Strongly dislike

-4.

-3.

-2.

-1.

0. Neither dislike nor like

1.

- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. Strongly like
6. Don't know

Q21: Partisan Ambivalence: *For each party, how much of the time do you think you can trust this party to do what is right for the country?*

for top 8 party candidates (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

1. Almost never
2. Once in a while
3. About half the time
4. Most of the time
5. Almost never

Q22. Electoral expectations : four questions

q22. Electoral expectations I : *Did you read or see any reports about opinion polls on the expected outcome of the presidential election in the past week?*

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

q23. Electoral expectations II : *How credible do you think are the results of opinion polls on the expected outcome of the presidential election?*

1. Very credible
2. Fairly credible
3. Partly credible/partly non-credible
4. Not so credible
5. Not credible at all
6. Don't know

q24. Electoral expectations III : *Personally, what candidates do you think will be the winners of the first round of the election?*

two options among all first round candidate parties / 88.Don't Know (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

q25. Electoral expectations IV : *And what candidate do you think will be the winner of the second round?*

one option among all first round candidate parties/ 88.Don't Know (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

Q26. Policy shifts : *Finally, during the campaign, some candidates adapt their messages in response to changes in local and global circumstances. Do you think that any of the following candidates have moderated or radicalised its views during the campaign? For each of these candidates, please indicate to what extent you think that they moderated, radicalized, or did not change his/her position during the campaign*

For the top 5 candidates according to the polls (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

1. Strongly moderated its position
2. rather moderated its position
3. did not change its position
4. Rather radicalised dits position
5. Strongly radicalised its position.
6. I don't know

Encouraging message: Thank you! You have only three remaining questions before finishing this questionnaire. To finish, let's go back to the 2017 elections.

Q27. Past electoral participation : *During the past presidential election of 2017, a lot of people did not manage to vote or did not participate in the election for other reasons. What about you in the first round of the presidential election of April 23rd 2017: Did you vote?*

1. Yes
2. No
3. I was under 18 or I did not have the french nationality during these elections

4. I was not registered on the electoral lists

5. I don't know

Q28. Past non electoral participation : *There is other ways in which people can participate in politics. If you recall the last 12 months, how certain would you say it is that you had ...*

q28_1. *Signed a petition*

1. I certainly did

2. I probably did

3. I probably did not

4. I certainly did not

5. I don't know

q28_2. *Contacted a politician to ask for a solution or action*

1. I certainly did

2. I probably did

3. I probably did not

4. I certainly did not

5. I don't know

q28_3. *Participated in a protest*

1. I certainly did

2. I probably did

3. I probably did not

4. I certainly did not

5. I don't know

q28_4. *worked in a political party or action group?*

1. I certainly did

2. I probably did

3. I probably did not

4. I certainly did not

5. I don't know

Q29. Participation yellow vests: two questions *Beginning in 2018 there was an mobilization movement often referred to as the "yellow vests movement." Could you recall if you participated in the yellow vests demonstrations?*

1. Yes, I participated regularly

2. Yes, I participated occasionally

3. Yes, I participated once

4. No, I did not participate

5. I don't know anymore

End of Survey

Appendix II. Survey Questionnaire of the Post-electoral Wave

Block I. Socio-demographic questions

To begin the interview, we would like to recall some information about yourself.

Q1. Gender : *You are ...*

1. A woman
2. A man
3. Other

Q2. Date of Birth : *What is your birth date?*

dd/mm/yyyy

Block II. Electoral questions I

As you may know, the first round of the presidential election took place recently. We would like to know a few aspects about your participation and opinion in this election.

Q3. Voting behavior 1st round : two questions

q3_1. Participation 1st round : *The first round of the presidential elections were held on Sunday April 10th 2022. For one reason or another, some people in France did not vote in these elections. Did you vote in these elections?*

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

q3_2. Conditional on q3_1 == 1, Vote choice 1st round: *Which party candidate did you vote for in the first round of presidential elections?*

All candidates first round (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

Q4. Vote intention 2nd round : three questions

q4_1. *The second round of the presidential elections will take place on Sunday April 24th 2022. For different reasons, some people may not vote in these elections. How likely it is that you will vote in the second round of the presidential elections?*

1. I will certainly vote
2. I will probably vote
3. I will maybe vote or not vote
4. I will probably not vote
5. I will certainly not vote

q4_2. Conditional on q3_1 == 1: *Which party candidate will you vote for?*

1. Candidate 1
2. Candidate 2
3. Blank or null

q4_3. Conditional on q3_1 == 2|q3_1 == 3|q3_1 == 4: *If you finally decided to vote, Which party candidate would you vote for?*

1. Candidate 1
2. Candidate 2
3. Blank or null

Q5. Attention check : *What are your main sources of political information? This question is included to make sure you are reading the questions carefully. For this question , answer only 'print press' and go to the next question, regardless of your habits.*

1. TV news
2. Social media
3. Print press
4. Newspapers websites
5. Discussions with friends and relatives
6. Other

Q6. Party identification: three questions

q6_1. *Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?*

1. yes
2. no

3. don't know

q6_2a. Conditional, if yes: *Which party do you feel closer to?*

All parties nominated for the first round of elections / “other” open question category available (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

q6_2b. Conditional, if no/don't know: *If you had to chose, do you think of yourself as closer to one of these political parties? If so which one?*

All parties nominated for the first round of elections / “other” open question category available (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

q6_3. Conditional, if party identification in 2a or 2b : *How close do you feel to this this party?*

1. not at all close
2. not close
3. quite close
4. very close

Block III. Experiment

Q7. Block randomized treatment assignment (see [Experimental design: main features](#))

Block IV. Attitudinal questions

[NB Q9 and Q10 in randomized order]

Q8. Satisfaction with democracy : *Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in France? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you are extremely dissatisfied, 5 means you are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and 10 means that you are extremely satisfied.*

0. Extremely dissatisfied
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

5. neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. Extremely satisfied
11. Don't know

Q9. Trust in institutions : *How much do you trust each of the following institutions from 0 to 10 where 0 means that you do not trust them at all, 5 means you neither trust nor mistrust them and 10 that you completely trust them?*

NB: randomized order

q9_1. *the government*

0. do not trust it at all
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust it
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust it
11. Don't know

q9_2. *the political parties*

0. do not trust them at all

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust them
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust them
11. Don't know

q9_3. *3. the parliament*

0. do not trust it at all
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust it
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust it
11. Don't know

q9_4. *4. the president*

0. do not trust him at all

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust him
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust him
11. Don't know

q9_5. 5. *the media*

0. do not trust it at all
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust it
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust it
11. Don't know

q9_6. 6. *the military*

0. do not trust it at all

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. neither trust nor mistrust it
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. completely trust it
11. Don't know

Q10. Political efficacy and perceptions of polarization : *Let's move to questions about politics in general. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you fully agree and 10 means that you fully disagree.*

NB: randomized order

q10_1. *I am well qualified to play an active role in politics.*

0. fully agree
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q10_2. *Sometimes politics seems so complicated that people like me cannot really understand what is going on.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q10_3. *Politicians promise more than they can deliver.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q10_4. *Politicians are primarily concerned about their personal interests.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q10_5. *Parties are extremely divided nowadays*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q10_6. *Parties and politicians in France are more concerned with fighting each other than with furthering the common interest.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. fully disagree

11. Don't know

q10_7. *There is at least one party that represents my view reasonably well.*

0. fully agree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

- 8.
- 9.
- 10. fully disagree
- 11. Don't know

q10_8. *Most of the parties in France are so much alike that it does not make much of a difference which one is in government.*

- 0. fully agree
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10. fully disagree
- 11. Don't know

Q11. Satisfaction with the economy : *On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in France? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you are extremely dissatisfied, 5 means you are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and 10 means that you are extremely satisfied.*

- 0. Extremely dissatisfied
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

5. neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. Extremely satisfied
11. Don't know

Block V. Electoral questions II

To finish the survey, we would like to ask you a few more questions about the results of the first round of the presidential election.

Q12. Subjective winner : *If you think about the outcome of the election, which candidates do belong to the winners and which to the losers?*

All parties nominated for the first round of elections (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

1. clearly to the losers
2. rather to the losers
3. neither to the losers nor to the winners
4. rather to the winner
5. clearly to the winners

Q13. Satisfaction with the electoral results : *Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with the electoral results? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you are extremely dissatisfied, 5 means you are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and 10 means that you are extremely satisfied.*

0. Extremely dissatisfied
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

- 4.
5. neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
10. Extremely satisfied
11. Don't know

Q14. Open question about the electoral results : *In one line, could you please tell how do you feel about the electoral results with your own words?*

[opened answer (max 200 characters)]

Q15. Affective polarization :

q15_1. *Following the campaign, we'd like you to rate how you feel towards the different parties. For each party, please rate it on a scale from -5 to 5, where -5 means you strongly dislike that party and 5 means that you strongly like that party. A rating of 0 means you have no feelings one way or the other. If you come to a party you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, you can answer 'don't know.'*

for all first round candidate parties (cf: [Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022](#))

- 5. Strongly dislike
- 4.
- 3.
- 2.
- 1.
0. Neither dislike nor like
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

- 4.
5. Strongly like
6. Don't know

q15_2. *For each party, how much of the time do you think you can trust this party to do what is right for the country?*

1. Almost never
2. Once in a while
3. About half the time
4. Most of the time
5. Almost never

Debriefing message

Thank you for participating to this study!

We inform you that for the purpose of the study, different versions of this questionnaire have been presented to the participants.

For any further request or complementary information about this survey, we remind you that you can contact at any time the project coordinators at the following addresses: morgan.lecorre@eui.eu / alvaro.canalejo@eui.eu. For any ethical enquiry, you can also contact the EUI ethics committee at fatma.sayed@eui.eu. Any complaint or request regarding this study can be addressed to the project coordinators and the data protection officer of the European University Institute (data_protection_officer@eui.eu)

We will contact you by May 2nd regarding the prize for your participation to our surveys.

Appendix III. Official List of Party Candidates March 2022

1. Lutte Ouvrière – LO (Nathalie Arthaud)
2. Debout la France ! – DLF (Nicolas Dupont-Aignan)
3. Europe Ecologie les Verts – EELV (Yannick Jadot)
4. le Parti Socialiste -PS (Anne Hidalgo)
5. Résistons ! – RES (Jean Lassalle)
6. Rassemblement National – RN (Marine Le Pen)
7. La République en Marche -LREM (Emmanuel Macron)
8. La France Insoumise – LFI (Jean-Luc Mélenchon)
9. Les Républicains (Valérie Pécresse)
10. Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste – NPA (Philippe Poutou)
11. Parti Communiste Français – PCF (Fabien Roussel)
12. Reconquête - REC (Éric Zemmour)

Appendix IV. Manipulation Checks for the Pilot Study

Introductory text

“To finish the survey, we would like you to imagine a hypothetical situation in which the 1st round of the presidential elections were hold yesterday.

Now, I would like you to read the following statement and answer a few questions about it”

Hypothetical results

Based on the estimation of aggregated opinion polls by POLITICO on the 16th of March

Macron: 30%

Le Pen: 18%

Zemmour: 12%

Pécresse: 11%

Post-treatment questions

Q1. After reading this text, to what extent do you think people like you have a say in politics?

1. To a very large extent
2. To a large extent
3. To a moderate extent
4. To a small extent
5. To a very small extent

Q2. To what extent do you think that anyone should have the right to participate in politics regardless of his political views?

1. To a very large extent
2. To a large extent
3. To a moderate extent
4. To a small extent

5. To a very small extent

Q3. To what extent do you think this text was difficult or easy to understand?

1. To a very large extent

2. To a large extent

3. To a moderate extent

4. To a small extent

5. To a very small extent

Q4. According to you, how likely is it that a text like this is found in a news's article or website?

1. Extremely likely

2. Very likely

3. Somehow likely

4. Not too likely

5. Not at all likely